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Are women less corrupt in business? We revisit this question using firm-level data from the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, which measure firms’ experience of corruption and the 
gender of their owners and top managers. We find that women in positions of influence are 
associated with less corruption: female-owned businesses pay less in bribes and 
corruption is seen as less of an obstacle in companies where women are represented in 
top management. By providing evidence that women are, ethically at least, good for 
business our research contributes to the literature on development, gender equality, and 
corruption more generally. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many studies have identified a significant association between women and lower levels of 
corruption. This basic pattern has been observed in different social contexts, time periods, 
indicators of corruption, and in a variety of micro and macro-data (Dollar, Fisman & Gatti, 
1999; Rivas, 2013). However, recent studies using experimental approaches have presented 
mixed evidence, arguing that if gender has an effect on corruption it may depend on 
institutional and cultural context (Frank, Lambsdorff & Boehm, 2011; Armantier & Boly, 
2011). We revisit this puzzle using firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys, a series of global surveys that contain data on firms’ direct experience of corruption, 
including bribery and the degree to which corruption is seen an as obstacle to doing business. 
Such direct evidence is considered by many to be a better way of measuring corruption; one 
that is far superior to approaches that rely on the perceptions of ‘experts’ (Reinikka & 
Svensson, 2006; Treisman, 2007). Our findings suggest that women in business are less 
corrupt: female-owned businesses tend to pay less in bribes and female managers are 
associated with a reduction in the perception that corruption is an obstacle to the operations 
of the company. Furthermore, we observe that cultural and institutional variables moderate 
the effect of gender on corruption, helping to explain some of the diverse findings in recent 
experimental studies. 
Corruption remains a persistent problem in both developed and developing countries 
and women are still under-represented in senior management, even in countries that have 
achieved high levels of development and gender equality.1 There has been a strong push 
                                                          
1 Apart from the debate over the potential for corruption to “grease the wheels” of an economy, most studies 
argue that it is harmful for development. For example, Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme (2002) find that 
corruption is associated with increased poverty and inequality and Breen and Gillanders (2012) find that it 
damages the quality of business regulation. 
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within the NGO sector and by global organizations like the World Bank and the United 
Nations to support gender equality as a way of promoting development and fighting 
corruption (World Bank, 2010). The need to eradicate corruption and achieve gender equality 
have prompted France and Norway to enact legislation that requires companies to have 40 per 
cent female board representation and the European Commission has proposed legislation that 
would extend this to all publicly listed companies in the European Union except small and 
medium enterprises. 
This paper is organised as follows. First, we review the cross-country empirical 
literature on gender and corruption, as well recent studies which use survey data and 
experimental approaches. Second, we discuss the plausible link between gender and lower 
levels of corruption in the business world. Third, we report our method and empirical 
analysis. The empirical analysis is presented in two parts: the first presents our findings for 
the entire sample and the second presents out findings for sub-samples that differ by 
institutional and cultural context. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and their 
relevance to the literature on development, gender equality, and corruption. 
 
2. GENDER AND CORRUPTION 
As we have seen, many studies have identified a significant and meaningful association 
between gender and lower levels of corruption. Dollar et al. (1999), for example, find that 
greater female participation in parliament is associated with less corruption. Swamy, Knack, 
Lee & Azfar (2001), observe that at the macro-level there is less corruption where there are 
more women in parliament, government bureaucracy, and the work force; at the micro-level, 
women are less likely to use bribery and less likely to condone bribe-taking. Torgler & Valev 
(2006) find that men are more likely to be involved in corrupt activities. Notwithstanding 
3 
 
these findings, there are several formidable obstacles that stand between us and a better 
understanding of the effect of gender on corruption. The first major obstacle is the challenge 
of measuring corruption. The majority of studies that we have examined tend to use 
perception-based measures, which have been criticised as suffering potentially from 
perception biases (Svensson, 2003; Reinikka & Svensson, 2006; Fan, Lin & Treisman, 2009) 
and a tendency to lag reality (Knack, 2007; Kenny, 2009). 
The second major obstacle, highlighted in Treisman’s (2007) seminal study, is the 
problem of ecological inference: in this case the problem of inferring individual behaviour 
from group-level data. In other words, the statistically significant relationships that we find in 
the gender and corruption literature may simply be picking up the effects of liberal 
democracy or some other unidentified factor. Indeed, Sung (2003) finds that gender has a 
smaller effect on corruption once rule of law, democracy and freedom of the press are 
introduced as control variables. Researchers are right to question if the macro-relationship 
between gender and corruption is due to spurious correlation and (or) reverse causality, as 
these problems are ubiquitous in social science. 
The third obstacle is the difficulty of identifying the precise mechanism(s) linking 
gender and corruption. Risk aversion is by far the most popular mechanism in the literature, 
and one of the most consistent gender differences identified across many academic 
disciplines (Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). However, it has not always 
been identified as an important mechanism in some recent experimental studies (Frank, 
Lambsdorff & Boehm, 2011). 
Recent studies have addressed these concerns in several ways. First, some have made 
use of reliable micro-data on corrupt activities from well-designed surveys (see for example 
Diaby & Sylwester, 2015; Gillanders, 2014). Using data from the Afrobarometer, Justesen & 
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Bjørnskov (2014) show that males and younger people are more likely to pay bribes in 
general. Our work can be differentiated from theirs as we focus on bribery within the 
business world, which differs considerably to bribery by individuals who wish to gain access 
to public services. Corrupt firms may use bribery to gain competitive advantages in the 
market place, as well as to gain access to public services. 
Second, researchers have used field and lab experiments to explore the relationship 
between gender and bribery. Unlike many macro studies, experimental work has tended to 
focus on corrupt transactions rather than perceptions. These studies have also yielded mixed 
evidence about the effect of gender on corruption. Frank, Lambsdorff & Boehm (2011: 68) 
report that women are not necessarily more honest or averse to corruption in the lab or the 
field. Armantier & Boly (2011) present a similar result in their experimental analysis of 
exam-grading in Burkina Faso. They find that gender does not have a significant effect on the 
likelihood of accepting a bribe. Alhassan-Alolo (2007) reports no gender difference in terms 
of condoning gift acceptance by public officials in Ghana’s passport office. Alatas, Cameron, 
Chaudhuri, Erkal & Gangadharan (2009) observe that women in Australia are less tolerant of 
corruption, but that there are no significant gender differences in India, Indonesia, and 
Singapore. 
While the majority of these studies explore the role of women as bribees, our article is 
concerned with the effect of women as bribers. In her work, Rivas (2013) explores the role of 
women as both bribers and bribes. In a controlled environment, participants in her study take 
the role of a firm or a public official. She finds that both the frequency of bribes and the 
amount offered are higher if a participant is male and they are assigned to a firm. Rivas 
concludes that women offer a bribe less frequently than men but even when women do offer a 
bribe, the amount is still lower than when males offer a bribe. 
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To summarize, the literature is split between macro studies that usually report that 
women are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption and studies that use field and 
lab experiments, which present mixed evidence. Despite some contradictory findings, these 
studies contain important lessons about how to deal with the theoretical and methodological 
challenges inherent in the study of gender and corruption. The first lesson is that we must be 
cautious about whether our data is really measuring corruption, as perception and experience-
based indicators are very different (Treisman, 2007; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010). The 
second lesson is that corruption occurs at the individual level, so we need to be careful about 
drawing inferences from macro-level indicators. The third lesson is that we must consider 
external validity: lab and field experiments take place within a wide array of cultural and 
institutional contexts, which may explain the diverse findings. More carefully designed cross 
country studies based on reliable micro-data can complement existing work using lab and 
field experiments. 
Our contribution is complementary to recent experimental studies, and it takes 
advantage of many of these lessons. However, our firm-level data does not allow us to 
observe directly the mechanism of action. Nor are we able to resolve the more fundamental 
debate within and between many academic disciplines about whether the behavioural 
differences that we observe are due to biology or the social construction of gender roles. 
Nevertheless, we are able to make theoretically-informed decisions to split our sample by risk 
of detection and punishment. We are also able to leverage firm-level data that provide an 
insight into gender, corruption and business practices across the world. Moreover, our firm-
level data address many of the concerns identified in the literature, as we are able to make use 
of experience-based measures of corruption and control for the gender of individual survey 
respondents.  
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3. WHO GREASES THE WHEEL? GENDER AND CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS 
Corruption can take many forms within the context of the business world. We focus on 
experienced corruption at the firm-level, namely bribery and the extent to which corruption is 
considered an obstacle to doing business. We expect that women in positions of influence, 
specifically female business owners and female top managers, are associated with smaller 
bribes and a more optimistic outlook regarding the effect of corruption on doing business. In 
this section, we begin by considering the effect of gender in top management and how this 
may have implications for corruption. We then consider some of the leading mechanisms in 
the literature that may explain the relationship between gender and corruption. 
Research on the effect of gender in the business world suggests that it is an important 
source of variation in management practices and firm performance. Soares, Marquis & Lee 
(2011), for example, find that businesses led by women have higher levels of corporate social 
responsibility. Labelle, Gargouri & Francoeur (2010) find that boardroom diversity in terms 
of gender results in a better standard of higher financial reporting. Hafsi & Turgut (2013) 
report that gender and age have a significant effect on corporate social performance. In 
particular, ‘women, minority or foreign based directors have been shown to be more sensitive 
to the social performance of the firm’ (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013: 466). 
Both conventional wisdom and previous research suggests that individuals at the top 
of the corporate hierarchy have the power to affect corruption (Clarke & Xu, 2002). If top 
managers support bribery or do not treat the issue seriously, by using policies and procedures 
to detect, eliminate and sanction illegal activities, this may foster a culture of corruption 
within an organization. Indeed, corrupt activities are widely tolerated in many contexts and 
are sometimes considered mandatory for doing business. One study, for example, found that 
top executives who have engaged in corruption tend to rationalize their actions as a necessity 
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for being competitive (Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009). Nevertheless, by definition, 
corruption is never a legitimate act, no matter how widely tolerated. 
There are several potential channels through which gender may affect corruption. One 
channel is through its effect on other employees’ expectations. For example, employees that 
work in companies where women are better represented in upper management may determine 
that corruption is generally less tolerated within the firm. Another channel is by favouring 
business strategies that rely on less corruption or focusing business activities in areas where 
corruption is less prevalent. However, these channels assume that women have a preference 
for less corruption and that they always tend to support business strategies that are in line 
with their preferences. Both preference formation and the link between preferences and 
outcome are not straightforward. Indeed, there is a controversial debate about whether gender 
differences are socially constructed, biologically determined, or some combination of both 
(Kohlberg, 1969; Gilligan, 1982). 
Within this debate, researchers have identified behavioural differences between men 
and women that suggest a cluster of behaviours that are somewhat, but we cannot say 
decisively, inconsistent with corruption. For example, Dreber & Johannesson’s (2008) find 
that women are less likely to be deceptive in an economic setting than men. Furthermore, 
studies find that women are more likely to obey the rules and behave more communally and 
altruistically than men (Betz, O'Connell & Shepard 1989; Beu, Buckley & Harvey, 2003; 
Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Buchan, Croson & Solnick, 2008); that women take fewer 
risks in investment decisions (Barber & Odean, 2001; Charness & Gneezy (2011); are more 
reciprocal (Chaudhri & Gangadharan, 2003; Snijders & Keren, 2001), and are less 
competitive and aggressive (Loden, 1985; Rosener, 1990; Eagly & Steffen , 1986). 
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Furthermore, activities that we normally consider corrupt may not be considered 
corrupt in some contexts, implying that some institutional and cultural arrangements may 
activate the relationship between gender and corruption (Truex, 2011; Esarey & Chirillo, 
2013). The political scientist Samuel Huntington was one of the first exponents of the view 
that corruption in business might not always be such a bad outcome for society if it ‘greases 
the wheels’ of the economy (Huntington, 1968). Corrupt activities like bribery might seem 
virtuous if they hasten the process of vital business activities like registering property or 
obtaining permits.2 At the same time, not engaging in corrupt activities might be a risky 
strategy. For example, failing to pay a bribe to a corrupt politician or official might be seen to 
threaten the dominant regime and provoke retaliation.  If women have a greater tendency 
towards risk aversion, then we should expect to see less corruption under institutions where 
detection and punishment is more likely. As a consequence, our empirical analysis is divided 
into two sections: the first considers the general relationship between gender and corruption 
in business and the second focuses on institutional and cultural context. 
 
4. DATA AND METHOD 
Like many secretive activities, corruption is difficult to quantify. However, it is possible to 
obtain reliable data from well-designed surveys and appropriate interview techniques 
(Reinikka & Svensson, 2006:8). Our data comes from The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 
(ES), which document firms’ (self-reported) experiences of corruption, as well as information 
on firms’ characteristics and the business environment. The ES, which began in 2002, are 
                                                          
2 The most convincing evidence regarding the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis focuses specifically on countries 
with weak economic and political institutions. Guriev (2004) and Aidt (2009) find against the ‘grease the 
wheels’ hypothesis. Méon & Weill (2010) find that corruption is less detrimental under low quality institutions, 
and Dreher & Gassebner (2013) find that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. 
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representative firm level surveys that are carefully designed and implemented according to 
the recommendations in the literature. Our dataset contains observations on over 105 
countries, though our sample size depends primarily on our choice of dependent and 
independent variables.3 Our first dependent variable (Bribe) is derived from the following 
survey question: 
‘We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal 
payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales, or 
estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments 
or gifts to public officials for this purpose?’ 
In line with best practice in corruption studies, the question refers to ‘establishments like this’ 
to help elicit truthful responses. From this question, we calculate the total annual informal 
payment and use this figure as our dependent variable. We decided not to use informal 
payments as percentage of total annual sales because of the possibility of measurement error; 
too many non-zero responses to the survey question are in multiples of 5, suggesting that 
respondents may have been rounding off their estimates. Clarke (2011) reports that firm 
managers overestimate bribes when they report them in percentage terms. Furthermore, we 
drop 13 observations of firms that reported bribes in excess of one million dollars. The 
statistical significance of our findings is not affected when we include these observations, 
however, they considerably inflate the estimated relationships in most of our samples. 
Our second dependent variable (Obstacle) is derived from a survey question that asks 
‘Is [Corruption] No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle 
to the current operations of this establishment?’ The question should capture general 
                                                          
3 The full methodology is available at the Enterprise Surveys website. 
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perceptions regarding corruption but it may also capture individuals’ lived experience of real 
corruption in business, such as having to source inputs from connected suppliers. From the 
answers, we calculate a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm feels that 
corruption is a major or very severe obstacle and zero otherwise. This variable allows us to 
extend our study to consider firm-level perceptions regarding corruption, which may differ 
considerably to total bribes paid. 
Our explanatory variables of interest come from questions which record gender, 
including (i) ‘are any of the owners female?’ and (ii) ‘is the top manager female?’ Note that 
the World Bank’s manual defines the top manager as the ‘highest management individual’, 
and that this ‘person may also be the owner if he/she works as the Manager of the firm’. 
 We control for several important firm characteristics which may potentially affect 
corruption. First, we control for the degree of foreign ownership. Foreign-owned firms may 
not have access to same social networks as domestic firms, and may have to pay more bribes 
to do business. Second, we use a dummy variable that takes a value of one if some of the 
firm’s sales are not national sales, allowing us to control for the possibility that export-
oriented firms may come into contact with a greater variety of public officials. Third, we 
control for firm size using the natural logarithm of sales (see Fan et al., 2009). Fourth, we 
include a variable which measures the extent of state ownership (see Fan et al., 2009; Billon 
and Gillanders, 2014).4 Like our foreign ownership variable, state-owned companies have 
access to different social and political networks, potentially affecting the level of bribery.  
Finally, we control for GDP per capita in the firm’s home country, in order to control for 
likelihood that the level of development contributes to perceptions of corruption (see for 
                                                          
4 This variable comes from a survey question that records the percentage of the firm is owned by private 
domestic entities, private foreign entities, the government/state, and ‘others’. 
11 
 
example, Ades & Di Tella, [1999], and Svensson, [2005]) and the possibility that higher 
income countries may be less prone to tolerating corruption. 
[TABLE 1] 
Table 1 reports summary statistics. GDP per capita variable comes from the World 
Development Indicators. All other variables are from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 
(ES). ES monetary responses have been adjusted for prices and converted to US dollars. The 
average firm in our dataset pays 2746 dollars in informal payments per year though this 
varies substantially within and between global regions. The average firm with a female owner 
pays 2179 dollars and the average firm with a female top manager pays approximately 1349 
dollars. On face value, these figures suggest that companies where women are in positions of 
influence pay less in bribes. However, the descriptive statistics mask the important sources of 
variation in corruption which we described above, as well as the fact that approximately 80 
per cent of firms report zero informal payments. Given these constraints (namely a left-
censored dependent variable) we use the tobit estimator. Recent firm-level studies that 
consider corruption have used a similar empirical strategy (Diaby & Sylwester, 2015; Jagger 
& Shively, 2015).5 In addition, all of our models include dummies for industry type, as some 
industries may be more likely to engage in (or be targeted for) bribery. For the same reason, 
we cluster our standard errors by industry and country groups, allowing errors to be 
correlated within industry-country groups. 
5. DISCUSSION 
The findings from our statistical analysis are presented in Table 2. Columns 1-3 report tobit 
coefficients for our first dependent variable (Bribe). The first column includes a female-
                                                          
5 Jagger & Shively (2015) fit a model using a seemingly unrelated (SUR) bivariate Tobit regression. 
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owner dummy variable; the second column includes a female top manager dummy variable; 
the third column includes both owner and manager variables, and columns 4-6 repeat these 
specifications for our second dependent variable (Obstacle).6 
With regard to our first dependent variable, we find that female owners, but not 
female managers, are significantly associated with smaller bribes. This relationship holds 
even when both variables are added to the same specification.7 Moreover, the effect of female 
ownership is substantial: the presence of a female owner is associated with 6,785 dollars less 
in bribes, a very substantial sum when one considers that the mean bribe in our sample is just 
2,746 dollars (standard deviation is 25760 dollars). For our second dependent variable, we 
find that female managers, but not female owners, are significantly associated with a 
reduction in the perception that corruption is an obstacle to the operations of the company. 
This relationship also holds even when both variables are added to the same specification.  
From these results, we infer that there is indeed a relationship between gender and 
corruption in business, but that it varies depending on the specific aspect of corruption that 
we focus on, and on the specific business role. For example, the top manager, as one of the 
most visible members of any company, might create the perception of clean operations 
among other members in the company, while owners may not always take an active role in 
day-to-day operations. On the other hand, individuals’ experience of corruption might be very 
different to actual bribes paid. Hence, the owner may have the power to constrain bribery, 
while the top manager may not have as much of an effect unless she is also the owner, as top 
managers may themselves be constrained by opposing groups within the corporate structure. 
                                                          
6 Although there is some conceptual overlap in models which include both female owners and managers 
together, the VIF statistic indicates that multicollinearity is not a cause for concern. 
7 We ran an additional test where we interacted our female management and ownership variables. The 
interaction was not statistically significant. 
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[TABLE 2.] 
Even with a well-designed survey, one might doubt self-reported bribes. Therefore, Table 3 
reports estimates using a binary variable which measures whether a bribe has been paid or 
not.8 The findings, which are presented in columns 1 and 2, show that being a female-owned 
business reduces the probability of paying a bribe by 4 per cent. The remaining columns 
introduce an additional control variable: the gender of the ES survey respondent. We lose 
approximately half of our observations when we include this as a control variable. Columns 3 
and 4 present estimates using Bribe and columns 5 and 6 using Obstacle as the dependent 
variable. Female ownership remains a statistically significant determinant of Bribe when we 
control for the gender of the ES respondent. However, our previous finding regarding the 
importance of female management for Obstacle is not robust to the inclusion of the gender of 
the ES respondent. All else equal, female respondents to the survey were associated with a 
reduction in the perception that corruption was an obstacle to the operations of the company, 
regardless of whether there was a women owner or top manager. Since it causes us to lose 
approximately half of our sample we do not include this variable in all of our specifications. 
[TABLE 3.] 
6. CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The previous section gives us confidence that, in general, there is a meaningful relationship 
between gender and corruption at the firm-level. In this section, we ask whether this 
relationship holds in sub-samples of countries defined by three variables: democracy, the rule 
                                                          
8 We also tested our argument using bribes as a percentage of sales. We found only weak evidence –ownership 
statistically significant at the p = 0.1 – that female participation explains variation. This suggests that gender 
operates on dollar amounts rather than proportional amounts. Alternatively, the tendency identified by Clarke 
(2011) of managers to misreport bribes in percentage terms is at work. 
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of law, and religion. We base these choices on previous studies which have found that 
context matters. Our decision to split the sample, rather than include these variables as 
additional regressors is motivated by Esarey & Chirillo (2013), who argue that institutional 
and cultural factors may activate the relationship between gender and corruption, such that 
we should have different theoretical explanations for different sub-samples. For example, the 
risk for undertaking bribery under democracy and high rule of law is potentially greater, as 
detection and punishment is more likely. As a consequence, women, in particular, may be 
less inclined to engage in bribery in a democracy if risk aversion is the mechanism of action. 
Under autocracy and low rule of law, an alternative explanation may be work: sometimes not 
being corrupt might be a risky strategy if it is seen to challenge the regime. Religion is an 
important source of variation in cultural practices and behaviour, in some cases it prescribes 
how men and women ought to behave in a business context. Indeed, some religious and 
cultural traditions may place a greater emphasis or offer more guidance on corruption in the 
business world. 
Table 3 presents our findings from the sub-samples. We report estimates separately 
using female owners and female managers as including both dramatically reduces the number 
of observations in many of our sub-samples. The first two columns present estimates where 
the sample is divided by regime type (democracy vs. autocracy). We use the Polity IV 
(Marshall, 2013) dataset to measure regime and, following the literature in political science, 
we code a country as a democracy if its Polity score is greater than or equal to six, and 
otherwise as an autocracy. Columns three and four present estimates where the sample is 
divided by rule of law, based on Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2010). If a country’s Rule of 
Law score (ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5) is equal to or higher than zero, it is coded 
as high rule-of-law, and otherwise as low rule-of-law. Like regime type, a low rule of law 
environment may activate the relationship between corruption and gender, as the ease of 
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using corruption, as well as the detection and punishment of corrupt activities may differ 
considerably. Columns five and six divide the sample by religion, our proxy for cultural 
context, using the Correlates of War World Religion dataset (Maoz & Henderson 2013). We 
present estimates for Christianity and Islam. A religion is coded as a majority if at least half 
of the total population is a believer.9 
[TABLE 4.] 
Similar to our findings in Table 2, female management is not significantly associated with 
less bribery. However, female ownership is significantly associated with smaller bribes in 
all of our subsamples except the high rule of law group. The effect of female ownership 
is much greater under democracy or high rule of law than under autocracy or low rule of 
law, confirming our expectation that risk aversion is an important factor and that gender 
matters more in countries where the threat of detection is greater and punishment is more 
likely. On the other hand, female ownership leads to a similar reduction in the amount of 
bribes in both primarily Islamic and Christian countries, suggesting that  this aspect of 
culture is not as important as the institutional environment.10 
 [TABLE 5.] 
Table 5 repeats our models using Obstacles as the dependent variable. Like Table 4, the first 
two columns present estimates where the sample is divided by regime type; columns three 
                                                          
9 In most countries majority religions do not change during the period of the survey except for Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Eritrea, and Vietnam, where the majority religious group sometimes failed to pass the threshold of half 
a population. For Cameroon, Eritrea, and Vietnam, the Enterprise Survey data were collected in 2008, so the 
2010 observations of the religion data were used; in Nigeria, the company data were 2006, so the 2005 
observation of the religion data was used. 
10 The mean bribe is 2,913 dollars in Christian countries and 2,682 dollars in Muslim countries such that the 
substantive effect of gender is broadly similar, although the reduction in payment is greater in Muslim countries. 
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and four present estimates where the sample is divided by rule of law, and columns five and 
six divide the sample by religion. We find that female ownership is associated with a 
significant reduction in Obstacles but only under autocracy and Islam. Our results for female 
top management are similar: it is associated with a significant reduction in Obstacles under 
autocracy, low rule of law, and Islam. Therefore, it can be said that under autocracy, low rule 
of law, and Islam, firms that have women in positions of influence tend to view corruption as 
less of an obstacle to doing business. While both bribery and perceptions regarding 
corruption are affected critically by institutional context, the same cannot be said for culture, 
which affects how respondents think about, rather than utilize corruption in a business 
context. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Many supporters of gender equality assert that it has the potential to reduce corruption. Our 
findings lend empirical support to this assertion: closing the gender gap in the business world 
may help us to eradicate corruption. Firm-level evidence from the World Bank shows that 
women are associated with less corruption in the business; female-owned firms tend to pay 
smaller bribes and are less likely to use bribery in the first place. In addition, firms where 
women are represented in top management tend to see corruption as less of an obstacle to 
doing business, although this finding does not hold when we control for survey respondents’ 
gender. Reassuringly, however, all of our findings are robust to the determinants of 
corruption at the firm-level, including state ownership, foreign ownership, firm size, and 
exporter status, as well as the home country’s level of development.  
Although we have not been able to observe directly the mechanism linking gender to 
corruption, we have established that the effect of gender on corruption varies across different 
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institutional and cultural contexts.  In particular, the association between women and lower 
levels of bribery was much greater in democracies. The greater risk of detection and 
punishment under this institutional arrangement is indirect evidence that risk aversion matters 
(Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Powell & Ansic, 1997). In addition, the association between 
culture and perceptions regarding corruption suggests that culture is linked more closely to 
attitudes than outcomes. Taken together, our findings regarding culture and institutions may 
help to explain the diverse findings in the wider literature, especially recent studies using 
field and lab experiments, where the problem of external validity is always a challenge.  
Finally, it is worth reiterating the point that the negative consequences of corruption 
are widespread and extend much further than the economy (Brown, Touchton & Whitford, 
2015). Efforts to secure gender equality in business may help us to eradicate corruption as 
well as advancing human development more generally. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N 
Bribes 2746.25 25760.07 0 830538.4 17458 
Obstacles 0.39 0.48 0 1 53532 
Female Top Managers 0.16 0.37 0 1 30705 
Female Owners 0.36 0.48 0 1 49239 
Gender of Respondent 0.31 0.46 0 1 23346 
State Ownership (%) 0.66 6.36 0 100 54470 
Foreign Ownership (%) 10.06 28.29 0 100 54457 
Exporter Dummy 0.23 0.42 0 1 55086 
Sales (log) 13.27 2.36 3.82 22.95 50103 
GDP Per Capita (log) 7.42 1.16 4.51 9.69 54743 
Sources: World Bank Enterprise Surveys and World Development Indicators 
Table 2. Gender and corruption at the firm-level  
 Bribe (tobit) Obstacles (probit) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Female Owners -6,785***  -8,240** -0.005  -0.016* 
 (1,796)  (3,954) (0.006)  (0.009) 
Female Top Managers  -2,839 2,545  -0.036*** -0.026** 
  (4,899) (5,042)  (0.010) (0.011) 
State Ownership (%) -365.5*** -146.4 -112.6 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (109.1) (140.8) (132.6) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Ownership (%) -46.77 -76.88 -6.372 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (38.84) (70.26) (66.75) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Exporter Dummy 5,964** 7,686* 8,446** 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (2,697) (4,021) (4,026) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales (log) 3,260*** 3,160*** 3,366*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 
 (840.4) (1,070) (1,104) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP Per Capita (log) -28,482*** -26,847*** -29,240*** 0.026*** -0.02*** -0.00 
 (3,668) (4,824) (5,398) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant 127,596*** 76,288*** 100,282***    
 (17,286) (28,432) (32,134)    
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Predicted Probability - - - 0.380 0.400 0.383 
Observed Probability - - - 0.381 0.401 0.384 
Observations 14,184 9,649 9,011 43,013 24,650 21,346 
Notes: Columns 1-3 report tobit coefficients. Columns 4-6 report probit marginal effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level and are reported in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 3 Gender and corruption: alternative dependent variable and respondents’ gender 
 Bribe 
(Probit) 
Bribe 
(Probit) 
Bribe (Tobit) Bribe 
(Tobit) 
Obstacle 
(Probit) 
Obstacle 
(Probit) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Female Owners -0.0407***  -6,954**  -0.0119  
 (0.0102)  (3,449)  (0.0118)  
Female Top Managers  -0.0109  1,458  -0.0148 
  (0.00913)  (5,906)  (0.0138) 
Respondent Female   -3,458 -7,401 -0.0579*** -0.0773*** 
   (3,313) (5,064) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
State Ownership (%) -0.0015*** -0.0001 -94.45 -84.23 -0.0014*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0003) (114.6) (140.5) (0.000534) (0.0005) 
Foreign Ownership (%) -0.0001 -0.0001 33.75 -63.54 -0.0007*** -0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (52.93) (79.08) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Exporter Dummy 0.0505*** 0.0180** 3,391 4,904 -0.0360** -0.0450*** 
 (0.0176) (0.008) (4,104) (4,880) (0.0148) (0.0150) 
Sales (log) -0.0007 0.0039** 3,679*** 3,206** -0.0065** -0.0013 
 (0.0033) (0.0019) (1,178) (1,345) (0.0032) (0.0030) 
GDP Per Capita (log) -0.170*** -0.0591*** -32,490*** -32,575*** 0.0125 -0.0247** 
 (0.0128) (0.00831) (6,376) (6,274) (0.0146) (0.0121) 
Constant   131,116*** 116,631***   
   (34,701) (33,601)   
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Predicted Probability 0.197 0.082 - - 0.341 0.387 
Observed Probability 0.246 0.098 - - 0.343 0.389 
Observations 14,184 9,648 7,613 7,805 13,926 15,386 
Notes: Columns 1-2 and 5-6 report probit marginal effects. Columns 3-4 report tobit 
coefficients. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level and are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Bribery sample splits 
 Democracy Autocracy High Law Low Law Christianity Islam 
Female Owners -8,497***  -5,759***  -13,714*  -6,145***  -8,417***  -9,397**  
 (3,161)  (1,820)  (7,445)  (1,846)  (3,141)  (3,873)  
Top Managers  4,738  -12,715  -8,755  -2,571  -865.8  -11,590 
  (6,878)  (8,120)  (16,387)  (5,069)  (7,203)  (13,949) 
Constant 191,549*
** 
50,833 53,174**
* 
-6,183 204,910* -421,570** 119,032*
** 
39,410 179,746*
** 
-60,782 85,186**
* 
-15,755 
 (34,615) (38,397) (12,002) (33,277) (108,918) (206,618) (18,449) (30,906) (34,592) (41,417) (24,005) (41,786) 
Observations 8,923 7,160 5,024 2,272 2,927 2,878 11,257 6,771 8,783 6,914 2,350 1,693 
Notes: Estimates from tobit regression. Control variables (same as Table 2) are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level and are reported in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 5. Obstacle sample splits 
 Democracy Autocracy High Law Low Law Christianity Islam 
Female Owners -0.000344  -0.0432***  0.0173*  -0.0106  0.00128  -0.0407**  
 (0.00771)  (0.0140)  (0.00962)  (0.00747)  (0.00696)  (0.0204)  
Top Managers  -0.0162  -0.0739***  0.00651  -0.0428***  -0.00530  -0.0923*** 
  (0.0113)  (0.0259)  (0.0151)  (0.0130)  (0.0115)  (0.0310) 
Observations 30,251 17,800 11,759 6,115 8,918 5,763 34,095 18,885 31,433 18,029 6,336 3,898 
Notes: Estimates are probit marginal effects. Control variables (same as Table 2) are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level and are reported in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
